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A recent issue of The Yale Journal of International Law featured an
article offering a critique of the current prosecution of human rights vio-
lations in Argentina.I The authors of this piece are a courageous human
rights lawyer and active member of the Peronist Party, Emilio Mignone,
and two able North American attorneys, Cynthia L. Estlund and Samuel
Issacharoff. The article constitutes a valuable contribution to the discus-
sion of the legal and moral implications of the prosecution of past human
rights violations in Argentina. However, the article fails to give an im-
partial perspective on the issues under consideration and commits several
errors, thus distorting the aims of the present constitutional government
with respect to these prosecutions. The authors also isolate these aims
from the general context of the government's human rights policy.
While impartiality is often difficult with regard to such emotional issues,
the reader may achieve a more balanced view if these issues are presented
from a different perspective.
This Comment will first analyze in broad terms the general human
rights policy of the Argentine government. Next, it will demonstrate
how the prosecution of human rights violations fits into that policy. In
so doing, this Comment will lay bare the analytical flaws in the Mignone
article.
I. The Foundations of the Alfonsin Government's Human Rights
Program
Rafil Alfonsin and other members of the Radical Party elected to pub-
lic office adopted as their rallying theme in the electoral campaign of
t I want to thank Gabriel Bouzat and Carlos Rosenkrantz for their important help in the
preparation of this Comment.
tt Advisor to the President of Argentina and Professor of Law at the University of Bue-
nos Aires.
1. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, Dictatorship On Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights
Violations in Argentina, 10 YA.E J. INT'L L. 118 (1984).
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1983 the need for restoration of ethical values in Argentina. Such a res-
toration was to be based, mainly, upon the full recognition of basic
human rights. They were not alone in promoting such ideals, but the
results of the elections held on October 30, 1983, showed that they inter-
preted better than others the mood of the population. The Argentine
people were seeking an end to the violence and cruelty which character-
ized both the recent military juntas and various terrorist groups. They
also sought to eradicate the corruption prevalent in past governments
and other sectors of society.
In several speeches before and after the election,2 Alfonsim and several
of his closest colleagues stated the philosophical principles upon which
the government would ground its human rights policy: (1) Human
rights are moral rights which all human beings possess, regardless of any
contingent circumstances, such as recognition by a government or any
characteristics of individuals, such as race, sex, religion, or nationality.
(2) The function of human rights is to prevent people from being used
merely as instruments of others or of governmental or corporate entities.
Therefore, such rights cannot be cancelled or outweighed by considera-
tions about the common good or overall social utility. (3) Human rights
are violated by both positive actions and omissions; therefore, the dignity
of the person is diminished when people are not provided with opportu-
nities and resources to choose and actualize their own plans for life. (4)
The basic justification for a political organization is the promotion of
human rights; a government is thus morally illegitimate if its actions are
not so aimed. (5) The defense of human rights must be the concern of
both government and civil society at large; the protection of personal
freedoms must, therefore, transcend the limits of national frontiers and
must be undertaken by the international community as well. 3
II. The Implementation of the Government's Human Rights Policy
On the basis of these principles, as soon as the Alfonsim government
took office, it enacted a series of measures to enhance and protect human
rights. Some of those measures are forward-looking, seeking to prevent
possible violations of human rights. Other measures look to the past,
attempting to deal with the atrocious violations under prior
governments.
2. See, e.g., D. Caputo, Speech Before the United Nations Human Rights Commission
(Feb. 27, 1984) (on file with the author).
3. Id. See also M. McDoUGAL, H. LASswELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 313-64 (1980).
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A. Measures Taken by the Alfonsih Government to Enhance Human
Rights and Prevent Their Violation
A primary objective of the Alfonsin government has been to reinstate
fully what it considers to be an adequate standard of legal protection of
human rights. The government sent to Congress a bill, subsequently en-
acted as Law 23.077,4 which abolished certain criminal legislation dic-
tated by the military regime and the previous Peronist government. Such
criminal legislation had allowed persecution and discrimination and con-
tained draconian penalties for crimes of a political nature. Law 23.077
freed many people jailed for violating such legislation. The process of
reinstating civil liberties was also enhanced by the enactment of Laws
23.0505 and 23.0576. These laws, also proposed by the Alfonsin adminis-
tration, liberalized the freedom of movement permitted under parole,
probation, and recidivism statutes. Finally, Law 23.0707 established a
regime to compensate those sentenced under the harsh criminal codes of
the past. Under this law's terms, each day of detention during the mili-
tary government would count as two or three days of imprisonment-
according to the severity of the disciplinary sanction imposed-for pur-
poses of compliance with the courts' sentences. The government also sent
to Congress a bill, later enacted as Law 23.042,8 which permitted any
civilian convicted by a military court to obtain the nullification of the
sentence through the use of writ of habeas corpus.
To deter possible abuses of human rights in those situations in which
they most often happen-during military rule-Congress passed Law
23.097, which modified the Penal Code by establishing the same penalty
for torture as for homicide.9 It also declared punishable the failure to
denounce acts of torture and adopted measures to prevent acts of torture
in military quarters, police stations, and other detention facilities. 10 Law
23.09811 extended and facilitated the remedy of habeas corpus.
The new government not only attempted to reinstate a standard for
human rights by reforming the criminal law, but it also formulated mea-
sures aimed at improving the social and economic status of Argentine
4. Law 23.077, promulgated Aug. 22, 1984.
5. Law 23.050, promulgated Feb. 14, 1984.
6. Law 23.057, promulgated Apr. 3, 1984.
7. Law 23.070, promulgated July 20, 1984.
8. Law 23.042, promulgated Jan. 19, 1984.
9. Law 23.097, art. 1, § 1, promulgated Oct. 24, 1984. If the torture victim dies, the tor-
turer faces the same sentence as a murderer. Id. art. 1, § 2. See also C6digo Penal, arts. 79, 80
(C6digos AZ 1983) (establishing eight to twenty-five year sentence for homicide and life sen-
tence for murder).
10. Id. arts. 2-3.
11. Law 23.098, promulgated Oct. 19, 1984.
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citizens. Law 23.05212 abolished the previous system of censorship over
film exhibitions, replacing it with a system of classification that serves
only to protect minors and non-consenting adults. Law 23.26413 equated
the hereditary rights of children born out of wedlock with those of legiti-
mate children; it also gave the mother the same rights as the father in the
care of their children. Law 23.054' 4 abolished a statute that had allowed
individuals to be deprived of their nationality.
The government sent to Congress a bill that has so far been approved
by the Chamber of Representatives that would prohibit any discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, religion, sex, nationality, physical disability, or
political ideology in both public administration and the private sector. 15
The administration also sent to Congress a bill which would recognize
the possibility of conscientious objection to military service and permit a
conscientious objector to perform alternative civil service, such as work
in hospitals or schools. 16
Congress is now discussing an administration-sponsored bill addressed
to protecting individual privacy against intrusions such as wiretaps, un-
consented photographs, and the gathering of information through com-
puters. This proposed law would also regulate the rights of individuals in
such disparate matters as medical care, organ transplants, dangerous ac-
tivities, and libel. 17 The administration has implemented a National
Food Plan which established an organization for distributing each month
boxes with essential foods to more than a million families.18
With respect to the international protection of human rights, the exec-
utive sent to Congress a bill directed at approving the United Nations
Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Addi-
tional Protocol thereto. x9 Congress has already passed Law 23.054,20
which ratifies the American Convention on Human Rights2' and
12. Law 23.052, promulgated Mar. 9, 1984.
13. Law 23.264, promulgated Oct. 18, 1985.
14. Law 23.254, promulgated Sept. 30, 1985.
15. Diario de Sesiones de la Honorable Camara de Diputados de la Naci6n [hereinafter
cited as Diafio de Sesiones] 3673 (Sept. 12-13, 1984). The Chamber of Representatives and the
Senate constitute the two houses of the Argentine Congress.
16. Diario de Sesiones 6739 (Mar. 20, 1985).
17. Diario de Sesiones 3005 (July 31, 1985).
18. Law 23.056, promulgated Mar. 22, 1984.
19. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
20. Law 23.054, promulgated Mar. 19, 1984.
21. American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jos6), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
(No. 36) 1 (entered into force July 18, 1978). The Convention guarantees more than twenty
broad categories of civil and political rights, grants the right of individual petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, establishes an Inter-American Court of Human
Rights to which the Commission or any state party may bring a case, and recognizes the
220
Vol. 11:217, 1985
Argentine Human Rights Policy
recognizes the obligatory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.
In order to deter any future violations of human rights by the military,
Congress passed Law 23.049,22 which abolished for the first time in Ar-
gentine history the competence of military courts over common crimes
committed by military personnel during the performance of military ser-
vice. For crimes of an exclusively military nature, the law established an
appeal from the military courts to the civilian courts. The government
also created an Undersecretariat of Human Rights-reporting to the
Home Ministry-which is charged with receiving and investigating any
report of a human rights violation.23 Many local and regional authori-
ties, such as the Buenos Aires County Council, are establishing
"ombudsmen" or similar institutions in order to deal with possible
abuses by public officials.
B. Prosecuting Past Violations of Human Rights
The politicians now in office in Argentina reached the conclusion that,
despite all these preventive measures, human rights would be better en-
sured in the future only if the horrendous violations of the past were
investigated and their perpetrators punished. However, instead of adopt-
ing an absolutist approach to punishment, the government sought to ad-
dress the need for punishment at the minimization of future social cost
resulting from the destabilizing effects of widespread retribution.24 Leav-
ing the most terrible abuses unpunished could encourage future abuses.
However, punishment must be applied with prudence if the objective of
minimizing social harms is to be achieved. The democratic government
adopted serious measures both for investigating the fate of the missing
people (desaparecidos) and for identifying and punishing those responsi-
ble for their fate and other abhorrent violations of human rights.
In order to discover the truth concerning the fate of those who disap-
peared, President Alfonsin established the National Commission for the
Disappearance of People (CONADEP).25 Its members included many of
the country's most respected citizens known for their concern for human
obligatory jurisdiction of the Court. See Symposium: The American Convention on Human
Rights, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1980); Buergenthal, The American Convention on Human Rights:
Illusions and Hopes, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 121 (1971).
22. Law 23.049, promulgated Feb. 14, 1984.
23. Decree No. 280/84, promulgated Jan. 18, 1984.
24. Cf. Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 289 (1983) (pos-
iting that punishment can be justified morally, based upon a criminal's voluntary and knowing
consent to forego his immunity against punishment).
25. Decree No. 187/83, promulgated Dec. 15, 1983.
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rights and for their distinguished positions in the arts, sciences, journal-
ism, and religious and civic affairs. While some human rights activists
demanded a parliamentary commission, such a commission was unneces-
sary, since CONADEP had ample powers of investigation, 26 and both
chambers of Congress were invited to send representatives to it. The
Commission conducted a detailed and highly valuable inquiry, receiving
thousands of reports of violations and a large amount of testimony.
CONADEP systematized this information, transferred many cases to the
courts, and in 1984 issued a report which was presented to the govern-
ment and published, with the government's endorsement, under the title
Nunca Mas (Never Again). The usefulness of all this activity, backed by
the Alfonsin administration, is demonstrated by the numerous references
to this report in the Mignone article. 27
Long before the presidential election, the Radical Party candidates an-
nounced the outlines of their policy with respect to the punishment of
those responsible for the atrocities.28 Distinctions would be made
among: (a) those who established the apparatus of state terrorism and
gave the orders putting it into action; (b) those who, whether or not com-
plying with orders from superiors, committed atrocious acts; and (c)
those who, in a general climate of pressure and confusion, obeyed orders
to commit offences which did not constitute atrocities. While the mili-
tary personnel in the first two categories would be severely punished
under the law, members of the third group would be given the opportu-
nity to serve the democratic system loyally, from within the armed
forces. This policy was put forth clearly to the electorate during the
campaign and received ample support from it. One alternative proposal,
supported by several smaller parties and human rights activists such as
Mignone, would have made no such distinctions. At the other extreme,
the Peronist presidential candidate, Dr. Italo A. Luder, an able constitu-
tional lawyer, contended that it was exceedingly difficult to punish those
responsible for the violations of human rights in the face of the self-am-
nesty law that the military regime had enacted.29
This self-amnesty law constituted a major challenge for the govern-
ment, because Article 18 of the Constitution30 prohibits the retroactive
26. The government required all public officials, including military personnel, to testify if
called before the Commission. Id.
27. See, eg., Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 119 n.1, 120 n.2, 121 n.lI
and accompanying text.
28. See, eg., R. Alfonsin, Campaign Speech (Sept. 30, 1983) (on file with the author).
29. See Law 22.294, promulgated Sept. 22, 1983 (granting amnesty to junta members).
30. "No inhabitant of the nation may be condemned without a prior trial based upon laws
predating the facts at trial, nor tried by special commissions, nor removed from the judges
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nullification of a penal law, and Article 2 of the Penal Code31 states that
if the law changes after the criminal act, a judge should apply the law
more beneficial to the defendant. The government nevertheless fought
this self-amnesty law. First, the government posited a jurisprudential ar-
gument that statutes enacted by a de facto government have only a preca-
rious validity, outweighed by the obnoxiousness of their content, as was
the case with the self-amnesty law. Second, the government offered two
constitutional arguments: first, that the statute violated Article 29 of the
Constitution, which voids any measure attempting to concentrate all
governmental power in certain organs of government, 32 and second, that
the statute violated Article 16 of the Constitution, which establishes the
principle of equality before the law.33 These arguments formed the basis
for a bill that the government sent to Congress in order to declare void ab
initio the self-amnesty law. This bill was approved by Congress as Law
23.040,34 the first statute of the new constitutional period, and it opened
the door for prosecuting human rights violations. This statute was de-
clared constitutional by the Federal Chamber of Appeals in Marino
Amador Ferndndez.35
The administration itself encouraged such prosecutions by enacting
two decrees- 157/83 and 158/8336-ordering the trial of both the mem-
bers of the three military juntas under which the worst abuses occurred
and the heads of the guerrilla terrorist movements. By further decrees,
other military chiefs were prosecuted.37 Such decrees, of course, did not
exclude the prosecution of many more officials through suits by the vic-
tims or by public prosecutors or at the initiative of the courts.
At the same time, the government sent to Congress a bill for modifying
the Code of Military Justice, later enacted as Law 23.049. 38 The law
designated by the law [existing] before the fact of the case." CoNSTrrucI6N DE LA NAcI6N
ARGENTINA [hereinafter cited as CoNsTITcI6N], art. 18.
31. C6digo Penal, supra note 9, art. 2.
32. "Congress cannot concede to the National Executive, nor the provincial legislatures to
the governors of the provinces, extraordinary faculties, nor the sum total of the public
power.. . . Acts of this nature carry with them an absolute nullity... ." CONSTITUCI6N,
art. 29. The self-amnesty law would have violated this constitutional provision as it prevented
the judiciary from investigating officials of the junta, which itself had seized both legislative
and executive power.
33. "The Argentine Nation does not admit prerogatives based on blood or on birth.
Neither personal privileges nor titles of nobility exist in it. All its inhabitants are equal under
the law and fit for all employment without any condition other than identity .. " CONSTI-
TUCI6N, art 16.
34. Law 23.040, promulgated Dec. 27, 1983.
35. [1985] La Ley 521 (1984).
36. Decrees No. 157/83 & 158/83, promulgated Dec. 13, 1983.
37. See, e.g., Decree No. 3090, promulgated Sept. 20, 1984 (ordering prosecution of Gen-
eral Ram6n Camps).
38. See supra note 22.
Yale Journal of International Law
serves as the cornerstone for the implementation of the government's pol-
icy towards human rights violations by military personnel. The govern-
ment explicitly stated the political reason for this reform: to enforce the
distinctions among the three categories of responsible individuals an-
nounced by the Radical Party, distinctions that had received wider elec-
toral support than proposals making no distinction, and to allow the
army forces to regain their prestige by making these distinctions
themselves.39
C. Controversy Surrounding Law 23.049
Three aspects of the proposed legislation proved the most delicate for
its drafters and, after its enactment, aroused the greatest debate: (1) the
boundaries of military jurisdiction; (2) the role for the victim or his rep-
resentative during the trial; and (3) the scope of the principle of due obe-
dience. With regard to each of these aspects, the article by Mignone,
Estlund, and Issacharoff makes significant mistakes.
1. Military Jurisdiction
Since 1823, through different statutes, including the present Code of
Military Justice enacted in 1951 by the Peronist government, 40 the mili-
tary has been subject to the jurisdiction of military courts in the case of
both exclusively military offenses-those contained only in the Code of
Military Justice- and common crimes committed by military men. Mil-
itary courts have jurisdiction over the latter offenses regardless of the
status, civilian or military, of the victim, whenever such crimes are com-
mitted either in a military location or in connection with the perform-
ance of acts of service.41 The Mignone article commits three errors
concerning the interpretation of these norms.42 First, the Espina case 43
did not establish any additional requirement that the offense be a breach
of any specific military statute in order for military courts to have juris-
diction. Rather, it simply said that military jurisdiction was not a per-
sonal privilege but that a crime committed under military conditions
itself implied an infringement of military duty. Second, an act of military
service can never itself be a crime. Rather, the law requires that the
39. See R. Alfonsin, supra note 28.
40. Law 14.029, promulgated Aug. 6, 1951, [1951] Anales de Legislaci6n 4.
41. Id. arts. 108-09.
42. See Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 132-36 (discusssion of constitu-
tional attack on military jurisdiction).
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crime be committed on the occasion of or in connection with the perform-
ance of an act of service.44 Third, Mignone is incorrect in stating that,
according to traditional Argentine jurisprudence, military jurisdiction
was excluded when the victim was a civilian and that the present govern-
ment has expanded military jurisdiction.45
Faced with the preexisting Code of Military Justice and the case law of
the Supreme Court, the government confronted a constitutional di-
lemma. On the one hand, against the precedents of the Supreme Court,
the Alfonsin government concluded that, since military courts are ad-
ministrative courts and form part of the executive branch, military juris-
diction would contravene Article 95 of the Constitution,46 which forbids
the President from exerting judicial functions or imposing penalties. On
the other hand, imposition of civilian court jurisdiction could violate Ar-
ticle 18 of the Constitution, which prohibits any conviction by a judge
other than one designated by a law in force prior to the commission of
the offense.47 While Article 18 may not be applicable when the prior law
is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has held throughout its history
that laws providing for military jurisdiction were constitutional.48
In light of this dilemma, the government sought a compromise which
attempted to maximize the compliance with these two constitutional
principles: it repealed military jurisdiction for future common crimes but
retained it for past offenses. For the latter, Law 23.049 introduced a
broad and obligatory appeal to the civilian federal courts, which could
hear new evidence. This procedure of automatic and plenary review is
similar to the appeals process from other administrative courts, such as
the National Tax Court, and guarantees the constitutionality of a trial by
an administrative court.49
Moreover, Law 23.049 foresaw the possibility that the military court
could commit a miscarriage of justice. The law thus established civilian
court control over the military court, whereby a civilian court can take
over a trial at any stage if a military court unjustifiably delays it. There-
fore, the assertion of civilian court control in the celebrated public trial of
44. See C6digo de Justicia Militar, supra note 40, art. 108 § 2.
45. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 135-36. Several decisions of the
Supreme Court, however, had established that military jurisdiction applied even when the vic-
tim was a civilian. See, e.g., Jos6 Joaquin Avalos, 100 Fallos 232 (1904) (massacre of Indians).
46. "Under no circumstances may the President of the Nation exercise judicial functions,
arrogate the review or decision of pending actions, or reactivate extinguished actions." CON-
sTITUCI6N, art. 95.
47. "No inhabitant of the nation may be condemned without a prior trial based upon laws
predating the facts at trial, nor tried by special commissions, nor removed from the judges
designated by the law [existing] before the fact of the case." CONsTrrucI6N, art 18.
48. See, e.g., Coronel Marino Espina, 54 Fallos 577 (1893).
49. Law 23.049, supra note 22, art. 3. This policy has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Fernandez Arias v. Poggio, 247 Fallos 646 (1960).
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the three juntas before the military court,50 and the likelihood of future
civilian control over some of the remaining 1700 criminal complaints,
does not constitute an unexpected frustration of the governmental policy,
but rather a contingency that it foresaw and for which it provided.
The constitutionality of this interplay between military and civil juris-
diction that was brought about by Law 23.049 was definitively ratified by
the Supreme Court both in the cases mentioned in the Mignone article,51
and more conclusively in theAlfredo Antonio Giorgi case.5 2 It is unfair to
suggest, as Mignone does,53 that the members of the Supreme Court were
sensitive to political pressures simply because all were appointed by the
present government. Rather, the justices have a variety of political back-
grounds and have already demonstrated a strong independence from the
executive.
2. The Role of the Plaintiff-Prosecutor
The Mignone article places undue emphasis on the "traditional" active
role for the victim in Argentine criminal procedure through the querel-
lante system.5 4 In fact, while federal procedure allows for victim partici-
pation, the criminal procedure of most provinces provides virtually no
role for the victim. In addition, the Code of Military Justice did not
provide any possibility for the victim to intervene in prosecutions. Nev-
ertheless, the government believed that such a situation had to be cor-
rected. Such participation might, however, violate the constitutional
guarantees of the defendants, since it could represent a retroactive wors-
ening of their procedural protections.55
Seeking to balance the rights of both parties, Law 23.049 added a pro-
vision to Article 100 of the Code of Military Justice. Under this provi-
sion, the victim of the crime or his relatives can intervene in the military
procedure to request the court to order the production of any evidence
and to appeal to the federal civilian court.56 The victim may also
50. As a result of the decision of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces not to indict
the former Junta members, civilian courts assumed jurisdiction under Law 23.049, art. 10.
Clarin, Oct. 5, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
51. Reynaldo B.A. Bignone, [1984] C La Ley 258; Jorge Rafael Videla, [1985] A La Ley
360 (1984). See also Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 136-37 (discussing
Bignone and Videla cases).
52. Alfredo Antonio Giorgi, File 2733 (May 16, 1985). See also Mignone, Estlund & Is-
sacharoff, supra note 1, at 120, 123 n.18, 131 nn.47-49, 136 n.72 (description of the Giorgi
case).
53. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 137-38. They also state that proceed-
ings in the military court are held in secret. Id. at 129. Rather, under the law, plenary pro-
ceedings are public. C6digo de Justicia Militar, supra note 40, art. 371.
54. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 123 & n.17, 129.
55. See CONSTITUci6N art. 18, supra note 47.
56. Law 23.049, supra note 22, art. 9.
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intervene in any stage of the procedure before the civilian court. In the
appeals procedure, new evidence can be presented if it was not presented
to the military court because of excusable circumstances or was not
otherwise considered by it. Therefore, Mignone, Estlund, and Is-
sacharoff are incorrect in stating that the plaintiff-prosecutor is excluded
from the military procedure, that his role is unclear during an appeal to
the federal court, and that the federal court cannot receive new evi-
dence.57 Furthermore, thefiscal (government prosecutor) 58 is not clearly
subordinated to the executive, as the authors suggest.5 9 Rather, the legal
and constitutional status of the public prosecutors in Argentina is cur-
rently under discussion. Most fiscales and many commentators think
that the prosecutors are part of the judicial branch.60
3. The Scope of Military Obedience
Article 34 of the Penal Code states: "They are not to be punished...
5) those who acted in virtue of due obedience. ' '61 More specifically, Arti-
cle 514 of the Code of Miltary Justice stipulates: "When a crime was
committed in the execution of an order of service, the superior who gave
the order will be the sole responsible person, and the subordinate will
only be considered an accomplice when he has exceeded in the fulfillment
of that order." 62
The literal meaning of these texts seems clear: if the conduct, whatever
its nature, is within the scope of an order of service, only the individual
who gave the order may be punished. The subordinate who complied
with the order is guilty only if he goes beyond the scope of the order,63 in
which case the superior is still the principal individual in the crime and
the subordinate a mere accomplice. Fortunately, long before the atroci-
ties committed in recent years in Argentina, legal scholars have rejected
this narrow construction of the national codes and argued that they
57. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 129. Moreover, the authors' claim
that the Federal Chamber of Appeals is not even physically equipped for the introduction of
new evidence, id. at 130, is incorrect, as was amply demonstrated by the facilities available to
Federal Court of Buenos Aires (Capital Federal) when it took over the trial of the nine com-
manders of the previous Juntas.
58. See C6digo de Procedimiento en Materia Penal, arts. 114-22 (C6digos AZ 1983) (out-
lining role of fiscal).
59. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 129.
60. See, ag., 1 C. RUBIANES, MANUAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 29 (1976-81). It
is true, however, that prosecutors have recently accepted occasional written instructions from
the Ministry of Justice.
61. C6digo Penal, supra note 9, art. 34.
62. C6digo de Justicia Militar, supra note 40, art. 514.
63. An example of such an instance would be if the superior gave an order to injure a
suspect and the subordinate instead killed the suspect.
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establish neither a duty to obey blindly nor any immunity for the re-
sults.64 Rather, the Codes simply presuppose situations of urgency, coer-
cion, or confusion in which a subordinate lacks the duty and ability to
question the legitimacy of his orders.
Nevertheless, in the current situation, in which different emotions, in-
terests, and opinions condition the legal analysis, it was foreseeable that
the decisions of the different courts would oscillate between the literal
interpretation of the text and a reading wherein a defendant would have
to provide strong evidence of coercion or mistake concerning the legiti-
macy of the order as a basis for acquittal. Therefore, to avoid these un-
welcome differences of interpretation and the resultant extremes in
judgments-impunity for high officers or people who committed inhu-
man crimes, on the one hand, and harassment of soldiers belonging to
the third category, on the other-the executive and legislature decided to
clarify the Code's provisions on due obedience, permitting more uniform
interpretations.
Clarification of the Code's provisions focuses on the defense of mistake
about the legitimacy of orders. Under a literal interpretation of the
Code, this factor is irrelevant; under the opposite view, it becomes rele-
vant only upon the introduction of strong evidence. Lower ranking of-
ficers and soldiers faced all sort of pressures, propaganda, and religious
invocations about the legitimacy of the activities against subversive
groups, organizations deemed outside society and even humanity. The
government concluded that requiring evidence of these influences in
every case would prove exceedingly burdensome, superfluous, and un-
just. It was, therefore, fair to establish a revocable presumption in Law
23.049 that military personnel who committed such acts within the scope
of superior orders were reasonably mistaken about the legitimacy of these
orders. 65 This presumption not only allows for the admission of contrary
evidence, but is subject to two main constraints: (a) an individual who
complied with such an order must not have had any decisionmaking ca-
pacity concerning whether and how to comply with the order; and (b)
the act committed in the fulfillment of orders must not have been an
atrocious or abhorrent act. For example, no person who tortured a pris-
oner or raped a woman could allege that he had an order to do so which
he believed legitimate.66 The presumption and its two main constraints
64. See, e.g., 2 TERAN LOMAS, DERECHO PENAL 184 (1980) (no duty to obey clearly
atrocious or criminal order).
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echo the distinctions among the three categories of offenders which con-
stitutes the nucleus of the government's stance on human rights
prosecutions. 67
Curiously enough, Mignone, Estlund, and Issacharoff admit that Law
23.049 may be interpreted in a manner which recognizes and preserves
the culpability of those who committed acts such as murder or torture,
yet they unjustifiably argue that this interpretation actually frustrates the
government's efforts to shield the majority of those who committed
human rights abuses. 68 Rather than accepting the obvious conclusion
that clarification of the Code's provisions will lead to more just prosecu-
tions, the authors repeatedly accuse the government of sinister pur-
poses.69 Until there is serious evidence to the contrary, it is only fair to
give credit to the explicit and repeated statements of the government con-
cerning its aim-to distinguish between those who created and imple-
mented the apparatus of state terrorism and gave the orders, those who
committed atrocities, and those who limited themselves to compliance
with orders in a climate of pressure and confusion.
III. A Note of Optimism
Mignone, Estlund, and Issacharoff repeatedly say that the measures
the government has adopted with respect to the prosection of human
rights abuses in Argentina are profoundly anti-legal, raise concerns of
justice, and are not suited to the objective of re-establishing the rule of
law in the country.70 These very serious charges should be grounded on
firmer arguments than those advanced in their article. They do not
demonstrate any illegality of the government's measures, especially given
that these laws were passed by a democratically elected parliament,
within which almost all parties are represented, and that their constitu-
tionality has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court.71 Any al-
leged injustice must be supported by more than Rawls' characterization
of the concept of justice.72 The authors appear instead to adopt the radi-
cal Kantian dictum that any case in which a criminal is not punished is
67. See text accompanying note 28.
68. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 146-47.
69. Id. at 142-43.
70. Id. at 143, 149.
71. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
72. See Mignone, Estlund, & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 149 n.l 19 (justice requires that
"there be 'no arbitrary distinctions. . . made between persons in the assigning of basic rights
and duties ... ' (quoting J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971)).
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an absolute injustice which must be remedied regardless of the
consequences. 73
As for the political evaluation of those measures, the fact that they are
a means to enforce a general policy that received strong electoral support
seems to be of no consequence to the authors. In addition, their conclu-
sion that the government's approach will backfire and endanger the dem-
ocratic institutions that the government seeks to protect is a prediction
that should be based on some empirical evidence. The evidence from
other countries in which serious violations of human rights have oc-
curred points towards a conclusion far more optimistic than Mignone's.
There, although authorities were in a better position to prosecute viola-
tors than in the case of Argentina, they proved much more restrictive in
their attempts to do justice. Nevertheless, democratic institutions have
survived in those countries.
The Argentine government's firm decision to prosecute human rights
violations, irrespective of their source, within a general policy of promo-
tion of such rights, is without precedent in modem times. This policy is
not the product of the will of a small group of politicians, but of the
conscience of the people of Argentina, who, after having come close to
the abyss of absolute evil, have made a profound resurrection of human
dignity.
73. See generally I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
(1785).
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